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Finally, with or without IRB consideration, 
citizens have legal recourse for injuries they 
sustain, HHS may deny future funds to unethi- 
cal investigators, professional organizations 
are becoming more involved in defining ethi- 
cal standards, and tough regulations may be 
reinstituted if needed. Social researchers have 
not been cut loose from the many remaining 
sources of social control. 
The system of prior review for question- 
naires that Mr. Veatch advocates is, in fact, 
more stringent than the regulation of auto- 
mobile drivers and in some states more strin- 
gent than regulations governing the purchase 
and use of firearms. 
Veatch goes on, “One of the great benefits 
of the emerging HHS regulations over the past 
fifteen years has been a gradual restoration of 
confidence in the research enterprise.” If he 
refers to some form of lay opinion on a na- 
tional level, he is in error. Public confidence 
has not been altered by HHS regulations. Fi- 
nally, he writes, “If researchers are only 
shrewd enough to conduct research [such as 
the Tuskegee syphilis and Willowbrook hepa- 
titis studies] without using HHS funds, their 
experiments will escape the body of regulation 
that has improved the moral and scientific cli- 
mate of researcp, using human subjects.” 
“Shrewd enough, Mr. Veatch? Really, you 
go too far. 
Lauren H. Seiler 
Dept. of Sociology 
@teens College, CUNY 
Robert Veatch replies: 
Dr. Seiler seems to be confused by my 
analysis of the new regulations. He accuses 
me of failing to consider the wide range of 
governmental, professional, and institutional 
forces available to protect subjects of social 
science research. That was my point when I 
argued that the withdrawal of DHHS from the 
regulation of certain classes of research “will 
mean a new sense of responsibility for other 
groups, individuals, and government bodies.” 
Furthermore, I argue that researchers will have 
to rely, as they have in the past, on their own 
moral integrity. I am puzzled why Dr. Seiler 
sees any of this as “inventing facts” or being 
insulting to researchers. He shows not a single 
instance of either. 
If we have any disagreement at all, it would 
be over whether rational people who are 
potential subjects for research would consent 
to participate in such research unless they had 
some assurance that their rights and welfare 
were going to be protected. I maintain that 
they would not and that the local IRB review 
of research, including social science research, 
has in the past provided some degree of such 
assurance. I have never suggested that re- 
searchers in any but the rarest and most ex- 
treme case would maliciously harm a subject 
or violate rights. The real problem is that indi- 
vidual researchers, though nobly motivated 
and dedicated, may unknowingly harm some 
subjects or violate their rights. In all the IRBs 
on which I have served over the years, I have 
never participated in a vote that blocked a 
piece of survey research. I have on many occa- 
sions, however, seen researchers decide to 
modify their procedures as a result of the col- 
legial discussion with the IRB and, on one oc- 
casion, I saw a researcher withdraw his 
research after IRB approval on the grounds 
that he could not cope adequately with the eth- 
ical questions raised by the IRB. 
If a researcher is hostile enough to the spirit 
of cooperation among colleagues and between 
investigators and subjects, he can find legal 
strategies to accomplish his objectives. As a 
sometime survey researcher, I fear that that at- 
titude will hurt not only subjects but, in the 
long run, the research enterprise itself. 
No one has ever suggested, prior to Dr. 
Seiler’s letter, that publication of a volume by 
a university press is sufficient institutional in- 
volvement to trigger IRB review. Data analy- 
sis using university facilities or any compara- 
ble institutional involvement, however, I 
would continue to maintain should be re- 
viewed-for the sake of the subjects, the in- 
stitution, and the research enterprise. 
On “Morality and Sex Change” 
The recent symposium on “Morality and Sex 
Change” (Hastings Center Report, August 
1981, pp.8-13) is interesting and informative but 
it strikes me as “skewed,” to borrow a word 
from one of its contributors. The authors are 
ostensibly dealing with the question of the 
morality (moral rightness, goodness, wrong- 
ness, or badness) of a hypothetical sex-change 
operation, not just its legality, but it is not clear 
that they are actually doing this. Each one 
writes from the point of view of an established 
tradition, which he is asked to interpret and 
apply to the case. For Baruch Brody this is the 
Jewish, for Richard McCormick the Catholic, 
for David Smith the (or a) Protestant, and for 
Stephen Toulmin the common law, tradition. 
Not one of them is giving his own answer to the 
question. Nor is it clear that they are giving 
moral answers. Common law is, after all, com- 
mon law, and a judgment in its terms is a legal, 
and not a moral one. It is true, as Toulmin says, 
that such law normally has “shared moral in- 
sights” behind it but this is not essential to its 
being common law; all that is essential is that 
customs be recognized by the courts, and 
customs are not necessarily moral (even when 
they are not immoral). Etiquette is also custom. 
As for Brody, he says, “I will draw upon 
halachic (legal) principles, “i.e., on a kind of 
Jewish law that cannot simply be assumed to be 
moral and is in fact, at least in part, religious or 
ethnic rather than moral. For all we are told 
here, the casuistic traditions used by McCor- 
mick and Smith may also be religious rather 
than moral. Religious principles and traditions 
are not necessarily moral, for example, the 
command to respect the seventh day or the tra- 
ditions of “ceremonial” law. 
In short, none of the authors is clearly doing 
what one must do to answer a moral question 
directly. Each is telling us how a certain tradi- 
tion would answer a particular question, where 
the tradition may or may not be acceptable to 
him and may not even be a moral one. Doing 
this is all right if everyone-and especially the 
reader-is clear about what is being done and 
why. In my opinion, however, not enough was 
done to clarify the purpose of the symposium. 
The unwary reader is likely to think that the 
way to answer a moral question about a particu- 
lar case is simply to apply some tradition of the 
sorts used here. 
If one means to answer a moral question, that 
is to come to a first-hand moral judgment about 
a proposed action, then one must take a (or the) 
moral point of view oneself(either by genuinely 
and reflectively subscribing to a moral tradition, 
or by more autonomous means), look carefully 
at the relevant facts, think clearly, and so on. 
One may, even on reflection, appeal to some 
authority, but then one should still be clear that 
one is seeking advice on moral, not legal or 
religious, matters. For example, it is not clear 
to me that advice based on the first five of the 
Ten Commandments is moral; the reasons at- 
tached to them are mostly appeals to self-inter- 
est. At any rate, those of the Second Table, 
where no reasons are attached, are more clearly 
moral, as has often been recognized by theolo- 
gians. Yet, if they are interpreted as theological 
voluntarists interpret them, that is as “positive” 
commands on a par with the fourth, then it is 
not obvious that even they are moral, unless 
one assumes that God is taking the moral point 
of view in promulgating them. 
There is a great deal of discussion about “ca- 
suistic” questions these days, and a great differ- 
ence of opinion about how to handle them. I 
think this symposium is helpful, but I also be- 
lieve the approach cannot be finally satisfac- 
tory. All of the contributors recognize this, I 
know, and were working under the constraints 
of their assignment. Still, my criticism holds. 
While I am not entirely happy about the shift 
from “abstract and general principles” to “case 
ethics” that Toulmin discusses in his introduc- 
tion, I am for discussing cases too. But discuss- 
ing cases is not just a matter of applying a 
tradition, and one cannot amve at moral judg- 
ments about cases by applying traditions that 
are not clearly moral. 
William K. Frankena 
The University of Michigan 
Editor’s note: 
In further correspondence arising from the 
article “Marriage, Morality, and Sex-Change 
Surgery,” Michael Schwartz of the Catholic 
League for Religious and Civil Rights and 
James Carmody return to the case of Mother 
Seton. In their view, Stephen Toulmin’s reply 
(“Correspondence,” Hastings Center Report, 
December 1981, p. 44) to previous objections 
against his undocumented reference to her in his 
original article is insufficient, and only makes 
matters worse, adding a “further slur” where “a 
gracious apology” was in order. 
The editors wish to express their regret and to 
state that they have no reason to doubt the dates 
of Mother Seton’s husband’s death (1803) and 
her conversion to Catholicism (1805) as given 
in standard reference books. 
Stephen Toulmin adds that he also regrets 
that the reference to Mother Seton and the sub- 
sequent controversy “have distracted attention 
from the primary issue-the merits of the his- 
torical traditions of case-by-case analysis in eth- 
ics, to which Catholic moral theologians from 
Aquinas on have in the past made such notable 
contributions.” 
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